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THE ACT REQUIREMENT AS A BASIC CONCEPT OF
CRIMINAL LAW
FranciscoMuhoz-Conde*
Luis Ernesto Chiesa**

INTRODUCTION

In The Grammar of Criminal: Law American, Comparative,
International, Fletcher elaborated what he called a "communicative
concept of action."' According to Fletcher, it is necessary to examine
the context in which a movement or non-movement takes place in order
to determine whether or not we intersubjectively consider such
movement or non-movement to be a socially relevant action that may
trigger the imposition of criminal liability. His aim was to develop a
theory about how we understandactions instead of developing a theory,
as criminal law scholars often do, about how we can biologically or
psychologically explain them.
In light of the fact that, for the most part, we agree with the theory
of action that Fletcher defends in Grammar, in the first section of this
Article we will attempt to show why the communicative concept of
action should be preferred over competing concepts of action that have
emerged in continental criminal law theory over the past fifty years. In
the second and third sections, we will explain why we believe that
Fletcher's theory is also superior to Michael Moore's mechanistic
concept of action and to Douglas Husak's control principle, which are
the most important theories of action developed in the last decades in
the Anglo-American criminal law theory.

*

Professor of Criminal Law, Pablo de Olavide University, Seville, Spain.

Adjunct Professor of Criminal Law, Pace University School of Law.
We are indebted to Patrick Rideout for taking the time to read the text and provide us with
valuable criticism and suggestions.
I GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE,

INTERNATIONAL (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 408, on file with the Cardozo Law Review)
[hereinafter GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT].
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FROM A CAUSAL AND TELEOLOGICAL THEORY OF ACTION TO A

COMMUNICATIVE CONCEPT OF ACTION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

A.

The Causal and Teleological Theories

The act requirement as a basic concept of criminal law poses two
problems:
1. On the one hand, if the point of reference and gravitational
center on which criminal responsibility should be posited is
an act understood as a willed bodily movement, it follows
that any other factor extrinsic to the act, such as the
dangerousness of the actor, his belonging to a particular
ethnic or racial group, his political or religious convictions,
etc., should be excluded as a condition for criminal liability.
2. On the other hand, if one accepts, as is generally accepted at
this moment in countries that share our same cultural
background, that human action is a prerequisite of penal
responsibility, then we should ask ourselves which is the
concept of action that we need to use as the foundation and
backbone of criminal liability.
With regard to the first problem, today there seems to be
agreement amongst courts and commentators about the fact that
criminal responsibility and criminal law theory should be based on what
the actor does, that is, on his actions or willed bodily movements,
instead of on the status of the actor. It is debatable, however, whether
one can establish a unitary concept of action that can serve as a basis for
the theoretical and practical elaboration of the processes of attribution
that give rise to penal liability. During the last fifty years, the
discussion of this problem in German criminal law theory (and in the
criminal law theory of other parts of the world such as Spain and Latin
America, because of the influence of German criminal law) has been
dominated by the controversy between the causal (Mezger) 2 and the
teleological (Welzel) 3 theories of action. Both theories are based on the
assumption that human action is the cornerstone of criminal law theory,
and that its chief feature is the will. The distinction is that for the causal
theory, the concept of action does not require knowledge about what, in
the first instance, is the content of the human will, what the actor wants,
which is something that is examined during a later stage in the analysis

2 EDMUND MEZGER, STRAFRECHT (3d ed. 1949). But he started to stress his theory in
opposition to the theological theory by Welzel, see infra note 3, in EDMUND MEZGER, MODERNE
WEGE DER STRAFRECHTSDOGMATIK (1950) (Spanish translation). For more about Mezger and
his relationship with the Nazi Criminal Law, see FRANCISCO MUI&OZ-CONDE, EDMUND MEZGER
Y EL DERECHO PENAL DE SU TIEMPO (4th ed. 2004).
3 HANS WELZEL, DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFRECHT (11 th ed. 1970) (Spanish translation).
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of criminal responsibility (mainly, in the analysis of culpability or
guilt). However, for the teleological theory, the content of the action,
understood as the aim that the actor wants to achieve with his act, is also
an element of the very concept of action which, therefore, should be the
object of evaluation from the moment that we define what an act is.
The two theories allow for many fine distinctions and
interpretations, but, in the end, despite their apparent differences, both
coincide in that they maintain a purely individual concept of action
based on bio-psychological and naturalistic considerations, causal and
teleological, that make the center of gravity fall upon the perspective of
the subject who acts, disregarding the effect of the action or the
perception that other people have concerning the act. Only a theory
espoused by a small number of commentators in Germany, called the
social theory of action (Jescheck), 4 stresses the social relevance of the
act as a key component of the concept of action. This excessively
generic approach adds little to the other two concepts of action
previously mentioned. However, it has the virtue of underscoring the
importance that the social dimension of the act has for the concept of
action. In this sense, we believe that the communicative concept of
action maintained by George Fletcher in his Grammarof CriminalLaw
signifies an important step in the aforementioned direction. It still
considers the concept of action as an essential element of criminal law
theory, but analyzes it from a much more current point of view that is in
accordance with the actual conceptions that modem philosophy of
language supplies regarding the theory of action.
B.

Fletcher's Communicative Theory ofAction

In order to formulate a concept of action that can serve as the
foundation of a theory of national and international criminal law,
Fletcher highlights a point, in our opinion a fundamental one, which in
general, has not been sufficiently accentuated by the defenders of other
theories. This may be because they take it for granted, or because they
do not believe it to be a fundamental element of the concept. This point
is the idea that a concept that has to be assessed in the future by third
parties cannot be analyzed like a metaphysical abstraction separated
from its context and the social reality in which the subject acts.
For Fletcher, the first thing that needs to be noticed in the concept
of action is that human conduct is always a form of expression or of
relevant communication between human beings. Consequently, if we
4 DR. HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK, LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TElL (2d
ed. 1982) (Spanish translation); Dr. HANS-HEINRICH JESCHECK & THOMAS WEIGEND,
LEHRBUCH DES STRAFRECHTS (5th ed. 2000) (Spanish translation).
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consider the concept of action from the point of view of the traditional
theories (causal or teleological), we ignore precisely the only thing that
really characterizes human action in general, and human criminal action
in particular: that, regardless of any external assessment that can be
made of it, human action is, above all, a form of intersubjective
communication and not a simple causal or teleological process. To
buttress his theory, Fletcher offers various examples:
1. If a professor is teaching a class or delivering a lecture in a
classroom, and none of the students or participants gets up
and slaps him, that does not mean that someone is omitting
slapping him; however, if after the lecture, the attendants
remain seated without leaving the classroom, it is plausible
to interpret this as a form of protest or as something with
some socially relevant meaning. It is not necessary at this

point to examine the reasons regarding why the omission of
the action (getting up from the seat in the classroom) has
different significance in each case. The only thing that
should be highlighted here is that, from our perspective, the
same omissive process can, and in effect does, have
5
different meanings.
2.

Another example: Everybody knows that the guard at
London's Buckingham Palace has the peculiarity of
remaining motionless when he is on guard while children
pose at his side and tourists take pictures of him. However,
everyone knows that the guard is also performing an action,
namely, safekeeping the door to the palace, and that if
somebody tries to break in, it is likely that the guard will
proceed to detain him or to do something in order to stop
him. Does this mean that that he only acts at that moment,
or is he already acting, even if it does not look like it, when
he remains motionless in the guardhouse? If he is acting,
what makes his purely omissive conduct an action? Is it his
purpose, or a particular causal process, or the interpretation
and meaning that everyone attributes to the simple fact of
6
standing motionless?

3.

Finally, Fletcher posits another example of similar
characteristics: When the psychoanalyst listens, without

making a gesture, to what his patient has to say during a
session, how should one interpret his merely passive
attitude? As a causal process, as the exercise of a purposeful
activity, or as meaningful conduct for the patient or for any
7
impartial observer contemplating the scene?

5 GRAMMAR MANUSCRIPT, supra note 1, at 410.
6 Id. at410-11.

7 Id. at 410.
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With these examples, Fletcher wants to stress that acts, whether
they are actions in the strict sense of the term, or omissions, should not
be understood as a pure ontological causal or teleological process, but
as a form of communication, as meaningful conduct that makes sense
both to the person who acts and to the rest of us.
In our opinion, from Fletcher's communicative theory of action
one can derive another fundamental fact that needs to be taken into
account when formulating a concept of action. This fact is that the
concept of action cannot be decomposed, like the causal or teleological
theories seem to suggest, into a discrete event, or into a sequence of
isolated discrete events. Let us illustrate this by way of our own
examples.
1. The person who, with the intention to kill, loses control of
his actions while stabbing the victim and blindly and
impulsively inflicts more stabs than necessary to kill, acts
and kills. His act of killing should be assessed, therefore, as
a whole, without having to decompose his action into the
many stabs that he inflicted. Similarly, it is irrelevant, in
principle, whether a particular murder was produced by one
or various gunshots, as long as they are fired in a continuous
manner and with a unitary intent to kill.
2. The person who goes for a walk or a stroll performs various
bodily movements, such as, moving his legs, taking one
step, and then another. However, the act of walking or
going for a stroll is a unitary action that includes all of the
discrete steps needed in order to perform it, and should not
be conceived as a combination of various discrete and
separate acts.
3. The person who drives a motor vehicle necessarily performs
various separate acts like stepping on the brakes,
accelerating, changing gears, and moving the steering wheel.
These acts, taken as a whole, make up the single action of
driving and each of them would lack relevance outside of
this context.
Ultimately, what these examples highlight is that, in these cases,
the global significance of killing, walking, or driving a vehicle, and not
the number of stabs, gunshots, steps or driving maneuvers performed by
the actor, is what is of interest regarding the concept of action.
Contrarily, if we only emphasize the partial aspects or the different
temporal sequences of a unitary action that give meaning to these
fractional moments, the act will stop making sense and we will give
importance and meaning to that which in isolation does not make any
sense or has significance only in a different way.
This can be clearly grasped when one examines the different
defenses that negate the existence of human action.
Consider
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determining the responsibility of a driver in a car accident. Certainly,
somebody that loses control of his car because he used his hand to swat
at a bee that had just entered the window of his vehicle acts in an
instinctive, involuntary manner, if one only examines the isolated act of
swatting at the bee. This is not so, however, if one analyzes the event
from the perspective of the unitary action of driving. This is the only
way that we can know if the actor could have stopped the car, reduced
the speed of the vehicle, etc. These, in turn, will be the relevant factors
in order to assess whether he acted correctly from the point of view of
what is considered permissible in the context of the rules that regulate
motor traffic. The reason for this is that the act of driving a motor
vehicle is not solely composed of various interconnected actions. The
interrelationship between the different actions is the product of a
previous learning experience that, once learned, becomes habitual.
Obviously, the acts of stepping on the breaks, accelerating, or changing
gears are decisive when we assess the action of driving a vehicle, not
because of their isolated voluntariness or involuntariness, but because
they are elements of the very action of driving, which is the only one
that, taken as a whole, has communicative relevance and meaning. This
is why the passive or active nature of the discrete and isolated conduct
examined is often irrelevant; not stepping on the breaks or gratuitously
accelerating the automobile are things that ultimately pertain to the
broader concept of action implicit in driving the vehicle.
A different problem regarding the concept of action has to do with
the perspective from which we should analyze the meaning of the act.
Fletcher's theory on this matter dovetails with the one espoused by the
Spanish criminal law scholar, Tomas Vives Ant6n. 8 Vives Ant6n
defends an "expressive" concept of action in which an "action is the
assessment of an underlying fact and not the fact underlying an
assessment."9 The question that now emerges is the following: Is it
necessary to appeal to considerations that lie outside the very concept of
action in order to give meaning to an act? If so, this would make the
concept of action lose its fundamental nature and would introduce to the
analysis elements that are typically not associated with the act
requirement, namely: purely normative elements that vary according to
the context in which the action takes place. If the act that we make
reference to is, for example, the concrete "action of killing," the
possibility of an abstract concept of action is lost. Consequently, it
8 TOMAS VIVES ANT6N, FUNDAMENTOS DEL SISTEMA PENAL 203-79 (1996).

Spanish

criminal law theory follows this conception as well. See, e.g., Carlos Martinez Bujdn Perez, La
Concepci6n Significativa de la Acci6n de TS. Vives, in HOMENAJE A BARBERO, CUENCIA
(2001); PAULO CESAR BUSATO, DERECHO PENAL Y ACCION SIGNIFICATIVA (2007); FRANCISCO
MUNqOZ-CONDE & MERCEDES GARCiA ARAN, DERECHO PENAL, PARTE GENERAL 215-220 (6th

ed. 2004).
9 ANTON, supra note 8, at 205 (translated by authors).
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would not be plausible to talk about the general requirements that
should underlie every criminal or non-criminal action, be it the action of
stealing, of committing a homicide, or of forging a document. In any
case, even if we recognize that the concept of action that is of interest to
the criminal law is that of a "homicidal action," or an action constitutive
of theft, robbery, or rape, it is clear that this is the product of a choice
that the legislator makes in which he selects certain events as legally
relevant. However, this choice presupposes that the legislator had
previously determined what qualities or attributes the selected event
should have in order to later supply considerations specifically relevant
to the criminal law (definition of the offense, absence of justification,
and absence of excuse).
In deciding which considerations give meaning to the act, it is
necessary to study the considerations that underpin the other categories
of the theory of criminal responsibility (definition of the offense,
wrongdoing, and culpability). As a precautionary measure, we should
clarify that even though many of the problems that are analyzed within
the categories of wrongdoing and culpability are already present in the
analysis of the very concept of action, the basic elements of the act
requirement can be established without examining these considerations.
Therefore, there can be an action even when elements that are essential
to the establishment of the other categories of criminal responsibility are
absent. The following distinction illustrates this point: capacity for
action versus capacity for culpability.
Even though sometimes these two concepts are not easily
differentiated, one can theoretically distinguish between them. This
distinction has important practical implications. The capacity for action
has to do with the purely experiential ability to choose between various
possible courses of action at a given moment. On the other hand, the
capacity for culpability is the ability to choose between good and evil
and to act in accordance with the choice made. An action is not
culpable in and of itself. However, it is a necessary prerequisite for
culpability. Therefore, we should not include within the concept of
action that which is to be assessed specifically during the determination
of culpability.
C.

Importance of Social Context

Finally, a few things should be said regarding the importance of
interpreting an action within the particular social context in which it is
performed.
From the positions maintained by Fletcher and Vives Ant6n it can
be deduced that no socially relevant action exists in and of itself. Acts
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acquire their relevance and significance depending on how they are
perceived and assessed by persons other than the one who performed
the conduct. This leads us to establish as significant criteria in the
theory of action certain societal considerations that should be taken into
account before one assesses the legal considerations inherent in the
different categories of criminal responsibility. Therefore, we should
take into account the social importance of the action performed, the
reasonability of the course of action selected, and the reasons for
engaging in the action.
Naturally, these criteria can lead us to
demarcate a concept of action that is relevant for the criminal law.
However, what is of importance here is to establish that we already use
these criteria in our daily life in order to determine the social relevance
of an action. Typically, almost every act that remains within what is
socially important, or reasonable, or normal according to current
societal standards, negates the legal relevance of the conduct in light of
extra-legal considerations. These extra-legal considerations are later
transformed into legal considerations when one employs them to
determine the content of the different categories of criminal
responsibility. Let us illustrate this with some examples:
1. First of all, we can ascertain whether an agent acted
intentionally or with a mental element (intent to deprive
someone of his property, with knowledge of the criminality
of his conduct, etc.) by examining indicators that are
socially deemed to be revealing of those states of mind. For
example, the use of a firearm or a big knife for the infliction
of physical harm is generally considered sufficient to
establish that the actor's purpose was to kill and not merely
to batter. A financially troubled banker's misrepresentation
of the money owed by a corporation to his company is
probably the product of a fraudulent scheme and not of an
accounting mistake. The decision of a judge to wantonly
disregard his professional obligations is probably done with
knowledge of the fact that what he does is illegal and not out
of the fact that he did not know the extent of his legal
obligations. A tragic example taken out of the recent history
of this city can better illustrate what we have just said: After
September 11, 2001, what previously could have been
understood as the hijacking of an airplane in which the
hijackers would liberate the hostages if they were given
something in exchange (this was very common in the 70's
and 80's), today would probably be interpreted as the initial
stage of an imminent terrorist attack. This, in turn, would
trigger a different response than the one that we would
expect in the 70's or 80's (for example, shooting down the
plane before it is used as a missile against a target, which
presents a distinct legal problem).
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2. Whether we would recognize as reasonable a belief that
someone is acting in self-defense when the alleged aggressor
put his hand in his pockets and at the same time said "I am
going to kill you" depends on the context and the knowledge
that the threatened person has regarding the reputation and
personality of the alleged aggressor (maybe the threatened
person knows that the aggressor is a killer for hire that
always has a gun in his pocket, or maybe he knows that the
supposed aggressor is mentally ill and that he threatens
people with killing them all the time without meaning any
real harm).
3. Pulling the trigger of an unloaded gun may be an irrelevant
act or a joke, but pulling the trigger believing the gun to be
loaded acquires social significance and, consequently, legal
significance as well. By the same token, it also has social
and legal significance for a person to encourage someone to
get on a plane when that person has put a bomb inside the
aircraft so that it will explode. However, no legal or social
significance would attach if this person was solely
encouraging another onto the plane so that he arrives sooner
at a given destination, and then during the flight the aircraft
crashes.
All of these examples highlight that the concept of action only
acquires meaning in relation with a concrete society and as part of a
particular social system or subsystem. Of course, this model is never
value-neutral. In consequence, it is necessary to continuously interpret
the model and to keep in mind its relationship with a concrete mode of
discourse, that is, with the particular way in which people settle
agreements in order to regulate coexistence in society and the conflicts
that arise within the social order.1 0
From what has been said one can conclude that the concept of
action should include all of the processes that have meaning in a
concrete social context. From there one can take into account many
successive considerations that could determine the existence of criminal
responsibility. This is, in our opinion, the most important contribution
that Fletcher makes to the theory of action as a basic prerequisite of the
grammar of national and international criminal law. George Fletcher is
conscious that a theory of action relevant for the criminal law should be
elaborated from an "expressive" or "communicative" perspective. In
other words, an action should be perceived as an event that is a part of
reality, which only has meaning within said reality, and that helps to
explain and understand that reality by taking into account the context
10 About the theory of imputation in Criminal Law as a "Discourse," see WINFRIED
HASSEMER, PERSONA, MUNDO Y REsPONSABILIDAD 160 (Maria del Mar Diaz Pita & Francisco
Mufioz-Conde trans., 1999).
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surrounding the event. Thus, the theory of action should not be
centered on a priori ontological abstractions that have nothing to do
with the eminently social nature of human beings.

II.

MICHAEL MOORE'S MECHANISTIC CONCEPT OF ACTION AND THE

PROBLEM OF PUNISHING OMISSIONS

A.

Objections to Michael Moore's Mechanistic Theory

Several years ago, Michael Moore espoused a mechanistic theory
of action that is squarely at odds with George Fletcher's communicative
concept of action. Because of this opposition, and in light of the fact
that Moore's theory has garnered much support amongst AngloAmerican criminal law theorists," we believe that it is necessary for us
to discuss some objections that can be leveled against Moore's concept
of action.
In Act and Crime, Moore suggested that all the act requirement
means is that "before one can be punished for any crime whatsoever,
one must have performed some simple bodily movement caused by
one's volition[.]" 12 As a consequence of Moore's theory of actions as
"willed bodily movements," punishing omissions violates the act
requirement.' 3 However, exceptionally punishing certain omissions,
even if doing so runs afoul of the act requirement, is legitimate when
the injustice of not punishing them overshadows the reduction of liberty
that criminalizing omissions entails.14
From a normative point of view, Moore believes that his concept
of actions as "movements of the body caused by volitions" and of
omissions as "non-movements" captures the important fact that our
obligations to omit the performance of a bad act have more moral force
than our obligations to perform good acts. 15 Hence, the mechanistic
distinction between acts and omissions mirrors the moral distinction
between positive and negative duties. In much the same manner as it is
and should be true that we have a stronger negative duty to avoid
engaging in wrongful actions than we have a positive duty to engage in
righteous actions, it is and should be true that criminal responsibility

II See, e.g., Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 105, 112
(1996) (stating that the criminal law is generally concerned with "willed bodily movements that
cause harm to others"); see also Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 157, 184 (1994) (equating actions with "willed bodily movements").
12 MICHAEL S. MOORE, ACT AND CRIME 46 (Tony Honor6 & Joseph Raz eds., 1993).
13 Id.at 54.
14 Id. at 59.
15 Id.at 58.
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should, as a general rule, be triggered by actions and, only in rare cases,
by omissions.
In our opinion, the parallelism that Moore wants to highlight
between acts and omissions on the one hand and negative and positive
duties on the other hand is illusory. What is needed in order to
adequately explain why obligations to abstain from performing
wrongful acts usually carry more moral freight than obligations to
realize good acts is a robust theory of duties and not, as Moore suggests,
a theory of action. Consequently, Moore's normative defense of the
mechanistic concept of action fails to satisfactorily account for the
following three deeply held intuitions: (1) that some results that are the
product of omissions are as wrongful as similar results that are the
product of actions; (2) that the reason why we believe that some failures
to act that cause a result should be punished as harshly as actions
provoking the same result has more to do with communitarian ideals of
solidarity than with libertarian notions of liberty; and (3) that classifying
certain types of conduct as either acts or omissions does more to
obscure the normative considerations surrounding the event than to
illuminate them. Let us discuss each of these intuitions and the inability
of a mechanistic theory of action to account for them separately.

B.

Equally Culpable Acts and Omissions

According to Moore, "[w]rongful as it is to let [someone die], it is
much more wrongful to [kill them]."'1 6 This is premised on the
assumption that making the world a worse place is morally more
reprehensible than failing to improve the world. 17 Hence, the person
who acts and kills is more blameworthy than the person who omits and
lets die because the omitter who lets someone die fails to make the
world better, whereas the actor who kills makes the world a worse
place. This is not always true. The mother who contributes to her
newborn child's death by intentionally refusing to feed her is as
deserving of blame as the mother who contributes to her baby's death
by feeding her food that makes her sick. In this particular instance,
whether the result was caused by an act (feeding the baby food that
made her sick) or an omission (failing to feed the baby) strikes us as
totally irrelevant to the question of whether or not the mother should be
held responsible for the death of her child.' 8

16 Id.

17 Id. at 58-59.
18 Whether the death was brought about by an act or an omission also strikes us as irrelevant
to determining the amount of punishment that she deserves.
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The following example can also be afforded in favor of the
proposition that certain omissions are as wrongful as certain actions.
The sole emergency room doctor who contributes to his patient's death
by intentionally refusing to perform a surgery that would save his life
acts more culpably than a doctor who contributes to the patient's death
by recklessly performing the surgery. Intentionally omitting to perform
a surgery that the doctor had a duty to perform and that would save the
patient's life is more culpable (or, at the very least, as culpable) than
negligently performing the operation. In this example, the morally
decisive criterion seems to be the mental state of the doctor and not
whether he produced the result by way of an act or an omission.
What these cases illustrate is that what really makes a difference in
our evaluation of the blameworthiness of actors who contribute to the
production of a result by omitting to perform an action is whether or not
they had a duty to perform the omitted action. When it is deemed that
the actor did in fact have an obligation to realize the omitted action, we
will, in many cases, conclude that bringing about the result by an
omission is as culpable as positively causing the result by way of an
action.
Somewhat surprisingly, Moore seems to believe that the
"straightforward and intuitive" response in the case of the mother who
fails to feed her child would be to conclude that the parent who
produces the death of his child by abstaining from feeding him is clearly
less deserving of punishment than the parent who provokes the death of
his baby by making him eat food that makes him sick. The problem is
that, besides this bare assertion, Moore does not provide much more
support for his thesis. His response is much less "intuitive" than what
he believes it to be. As far as we know, all legal systems, civil and
common law, punish killings produced by certain omissions in the same
manner that they punish killings caused by actions.' 9 Furthermore, as
Moore himself acknowledged, there is support in the philosophical
literature for the proposition that some omissions can be as wrongful as
actions. 20 Criminal law theorists on both sides of the Atlantic share this
view as well. 21 In light of the overwhelming support in favor of this
proposition, it seems fair to place the burden of proof on those who, like
Moore, believe that there is something suspect in thinking that results

19 See, e.g., P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33 § 3092 (1996); Australia Criminal Code Act, 1995 §
4.3(b); FINISH PENAL CODE chap. 3, § 3(2); SPANISH PENAL CODE art. 11 (1995); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.01(3)(b) (1962).
20 See, e.g., James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78
(1975). Moore admits in Act and Crime that there is support in favor of the contention that some
omissions should be regarded as wrongful as similar actions. MOORE, supra note 12, at 58.
21 In Anglo-America see, for example, ROLLIN N. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL

LAW 659-62 (3d ed. 1983). In Germany see, for example, GONTHER JAKOBS, STRAFRECHT,
ALLGEMEINER TEIL 645-709 (1983).
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provoked by failures to act can be as blameworthy as those caused by
positive actions.
C.

The LibertarianConcernsfor CriminalizingOmissions

In our opinion, the reason why Moore is led to support the
infelicitous conclusion-that results caused by acts are always more
wrongful than those caused by omissions-lies in the political theory
underpinning his mechanistic concept of action. For Moore, punishing
omissions is problematic because doing so diminishes our liberty to act
much more than criminalizing actions. Imposing a duty to perform an
act, such as saving someone's life, restricts a person's liberty to engage
in myriad activities that can be carried out at that time and place, such
as swimming, sleeping, working or going to the movies. However,
imposing a duty not to engage in a particular act, such as killing, leaves
the person with considerable freedom to engage in whatever act he
wishes to perform with the exception of the prohibited action.
If one looks at these cases from a radically libertarian point of
view, as Moore does, justifying the substantial diminution of liberty that
follows from punishing failures to act is extremely difficult and, almost
always, impossible. This leads him to conclude that, as a general rule,
criminalizing omissions is illegitimate. Exceptions to this rule should
only be made when "the injustice of not punishing [such omissions]
'22
outweighs the diminution of liberty such punishment entails.
It seems to us that Moore is barking up the wrong philosophical
tree.
Trying to justify the criminalization of omissions from a
libertarian perspective is a daunting task. Attempting to do so will
almost inevitably lead to skepticism with regards to the legitimacy of
punishing failures to act. Upon closer inspection, however, one can see
that the problem of justifying the imposition of criminal liability for
omissions has a lot to do with communitarian notions of solidarity and
very little to do with libertarian concerns about the diminution of
freedom.
The reason why we find unproblematic the punishment of certain
omissions, such as the intentional refusal to feed one's child, is because
we believe that the duties of persons cannot be determined without
taking into account the fact that they belong to particular institutions
whose very existence depends on the acceptance of reciprocal
obligations of aiding the rest of the members of the community. 23 This
is most obviously true in the case of the family. We have no problem
22 MOORE, supra note 12, at 59.
23 See generally DANIEL VARONA GOMEZ, DERECHO PENAL Y SOLIDARIDAD 109 (2005).
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with recognizing that a parent has a duty to keep his baby free from
harm and that spouses have the obligation to look out for each other
because we understand that bonds of solidarity unite the members of a
family. Consequently, there is nothing "hard-to-justify," as Moore
suggests, 24 in the widely held belief that we owe more duty to those that
are near and dear to us than to strangers.
Recourse to the communitarian notion of solidarity also helps to
explain why it is not inherently suspect to impose on the populace a
general duty to rescue those in harms way. Because of the fact that we
are "social beings" and "members of a political community," we depend
on a very real sense on our fellow citizens. 25 Hence, subject to certain
limitations, 26 punishing failures to aid helps reaffirm the vital link that
27
unites both omitter and victim as members of a community.

D.

Actor's Intent, Not Act or Omission, Relevant

Another problem with Moore's mechanistic theory of action is
that, on some occasions, classifying conduct as either a "willed bodily
movement" or an instance of non-movement does little to clarify the
normative issues at stake. This is particularly true in the euthanasia
cases. Whether the nurse who contributed to her patients death by
terminating life support moved her finger in order to turn off the
machine that supplied fluids to the catheter or refused to replenish the
catheter once it became empty is irrelevant to determining if she should
be held criminally responsible for killing the patient. The only pertinent
consideration in this case is if the patient consented to having life
support terminated and not whether the nurse decided to terminate it by
moving the muscles of her finger or by refusing to move them.
The argument against placing too much weight on the
movement/non-movement distinction in the context of the euthanasia
debate was forcefully advanced by a leading lawyer and bioethicist in
the following manner:
The moral distinction between killing and letting die-between
actively and passively causing death-has been examined by many
bioethicists, philosophers, and lawyers. Most have concluded that
the distinction between active and passive, on which opponents so
heavily rest, is a distinction without a significant enough moral
difference to support the great weight that opponents of physician-

24 MOORE, supra note 12, at 57.
25 Id.
26 The most common restriction is to limit the duty to aid to cases in which the rescue can be
done without peril or danger to the rescuer. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (2005).
27 VARONA G6MEZ, supra note 23, at 115.

THE ACT REQUIREMENT

2007]

2475

assisted suicide have placed on it. From the perspective of the
affected individual, the sought for end-the relief of suffering and
demise-is the same regardless of whether the immediate cause of
death is described as active or passive, killing or letting die.
[Furthermore], [t]he line drawn ... between active and passive is

also vulnerable to a charge of inconsistency or arbitrariness. It is
difficult to know in practice why one thing is labeled active ... and
therefore not permitted, and another is labeled passive and
permitted.... Withdrawing treatment is said to be passive, yet many
acts of withdrawal are quite active, for example, "pulling the plug" is
literally an act. One cannot easily distinguish [these cases] in all
significant respects .... 28
Overstating the significance of the act/omission distinction
generates a misunderstanding of a very important fact in the context of
the euthanasia debate: a doctor violates his patient's rights whenever he
intends to cause the death of his patient against his wishes. Hence, if
the nurse in the aforementioned example were to withdraw life support
without the patient's consent, she should be held criminally responsible
for causing the death of the patient. It would be wrong to believe that
she would deserve less punishment if she chose to provoke her patient's
death by refusing to refill the catheter instead of by turning off the
machine connected to the feeding tubes. In both cases she is equally
blameworthy because what really matters is that she intended to cause
the death of her patient against his will and not whether she provoked
his death by moving her finger (act) or by abstaining from doing so
(omission).
E.

Supportfor Fletcher'sSocial Approach

From a scientific or ontological point of view, there is nothing
wrong with Moore's definition of actions as bodily movements caused
by the will and omissions as the absence of bodily movements.
However, the normative appeal of his theory of action, as we have
attempted to demonstrate, is limited. The movement/non-movement
distinction does more to obscure the moral principles at stake than to
illuminate them. Consequently, we agree with Fletcher's contention
that we need to situate the conduct of the actor within the particular
context in which it took place in order to understand its social and legal
significance. As a result of this, we should abandon the mechanistic
conception of actions as bodily movements and substitute it for a more
28 John A. Robertson, Respect for Life in Bioethical Dilemmas-The Case of Physician
Assisted Suicide, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 329, 333-34 (1997) (citations omitted).
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humanistic theory of actions premised on the fact that conduct acquires
significance by virtue of being intersubjectively perceived as an
instance of meaningful and relevant behavior and not by virtue of being
the product of a muscular contraction caused by the volitions of the
actor.

III.

THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHING POSSESSION AND DOUGLAS HUSAK'S
CONTROL PRINCIPLE

A.

The "PossessionProblem"

Twenty years ago, Douglas Husak decried the Anglo-American
obsession with the "act-requirement." His position was based on the
fact that "it is not clear that the presence or absence [of an action] is a
crucial variable in drawing the distinction between just and unjust
instances of penal liability. '29 This skepticism regarding the desirability
of maintaining an "act-requirement" as a prerequisite for criminal
responsibility led him to recommend that we replace it with an
'30
alternative requirement that he dubbed the "control principle.
In his contribution to this issue in celebration of the appearance of
Fletcher's Grammar, Husak made it clear that he still believes that we
"should suspend judgment about the act requirement, and probably
reject it altogether."'3' The chief reason that he provided in favor of this
assertion is that, contrary to what Fletcher suggests, punishment is often
justifiably imposed for something other than actions. A paradigmatic
example of an instance where criminal liability is imposed without the
existence of an act is that of possession since, according to Husak,'
possession offenses criminalize states of affair, not acts or omissions.
From a descriptive point of view, Husak's characterization of
possession crimes is, in our opinion, misguided. As he seems to
concede in his paper, one can conceivably interpret possession offenses
as either criminalizing an act or an omission. This, in fact, is all that the
drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) meant when they defined
possession as the "procure[ment]" or "rece[ption]" of the thing whose
32
possession is prohibited or as the refusal to terminate its possession.
Thus, in the official comments to § 2.01(4) of the MPC it is stated that:
[T]he concept [of possession] is an application of the principle that
conduct that includes a voluntary act or an omission where there is
physical capacity to act will suffice. An actor who knowingly
29 DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 97 (1987).

30 Id. at 97-99.
31 Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437, 2438 (2007).
32 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) (1962).
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procures or receives the thing possessed has, of course, engaged in a
voluntary act that can serve as the predicate for criminal liability. An
actor who is aware of his control of the thing possessed for a period
that would enable him to terminate control has failed to act in the
face of a legal duty imposed by the law that makes his possession
criminal. In both of the instances in which possession can be made
criminal, therefore, the principle underlying Subsection (1) [that
liability needs to be based on conduct that includes either a voluntary
33
act or omission to perform an act] is satisfied.
This way of thinking of possession is by no means new. More than
forty years ago, Professor Glanville Williams had already noted that,
properly understood, possession crimes do not pose a problem for
criminal liability because what is really being punished is either the act
of acquiring the object or the failure to get rid of it. 34 Recently,
Professor Joshua Dressier advanced a similar conception of possession
offenses:
Possession crimes do not necessarily dispense with the voluntary act
requirement. Courts interpret possession statutes to require proof
that the defendant knowingly procured or received the property
possessed (thus, a voluntary act must be proven), or that she failed to
dispossess herself of the object after she became aware of its
presence. In the later case, "possession" is equivalent to an
omission, in which the35defendant has a statutory duty to dispossess
herself of the property.
Even though he anticipates that possession could be construed in a
way such as to require the occurrence of either an act or an omission,
Husak objects to this description of possession offenses in light of the
fact that what we are truly punishing in these cases is the possession
itself, not the act of receiving the goods or the omission of refusing to
dispose of them. 36 Hence, stating that what we prohibit by possession
statutes is an act or an omission is just a clever way of avoiding the
inevitable conclusion that by criminalizing these offenses we are
actually not punishing an act but a state of affairs.
The problem with this argument is that the mere possession of a
potentially dangerous object is not noxious per se. What we really want
to prohibit is the use of the object in a harmful way and not its
possession as Husak suggests. As a general rule, when one possesses an
object it is either because one used it in the past or because one plans to
use it in the future. Hence, possession offenses represent an effective
way of curtailing the prospective use of the dangerous artifact or of
punishing its prior use. When conceived as a method of punishing the
33 Id. § 2.01(4) cmt. 4.
34 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 8 (2d ed. 1961).
35 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 104 (3d ed. 2005).

36 Husak, supra note 31, at 2439.
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potential future use of the object, possession crimes appear as a type of
inchoate offense. On the other hand, when envisaged as a means of
punishing previous harmful uses of the artifact, possession offenses

serve the purpose of facilitating the prosecution's case by relieving
them of proving the actual instances in which the object was used in the
past. This view is consistent with the one espoused by Professor Paul
Robinson when he states that:
[T]he definition of the offence [of possession] does not truly
represent the paradigm-it does not fully and accurately describe the
harm or evil the offence seeks to punish. Possession offences seek to
prohibit and punish not possession itself, but harmful conduct....
The possession of trace amounts of narcotics, for example, suggests
their past use or distribution. The possession of burglar's tools
37
suggest [sic] a planned (or past) burglary.

In light of the abovementioned considerations, we can conclude
that, contrary to what Husak seems to believe, there is nothing wrong
with asserting that possession offenses prohibit either the act of
receiving the goods or the omission of failing to terminate possession
when faced with a duty to do so. If, as we believe it is, the purpose of
these crimes is to prevent future injurious use of the object or to
penalize its prior use, it makes sense to affirm that the real prohibition is
not the possession itself but rather the voluntary act of acquiring the
artifact or the omission of not getting rid of it. As the example of a
person who had contraband "planted" on him demonstrates, mere
possession does not necessarily entail dangerous prospective or past use
of the substance if the person did not have sufficient time to end the
possession. Here, as in many cases, the gist of the crime is failing to
terminate control over the object even though the defendant had a
statutory duty to do so. Consequently, despite Husak's efforts to
convince us of the contrary, punishing possession does not violate the
act requirement.
B.

Weakness in the Control Principle

Besides criticizing criminal theorists who, like Fletcher, defend the
act requirement, Husak also advanced arguments in favor of substituting
said requirement with his control principle. 38 The essence of the control
principle is that "criminal liability is unjust if imposed for a state of
37 PAUL H. ROBINSON, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 63 (1997).

Professor

Michael Moore also agrees with the proposition that the true purpose motivating the
criminalization of possession crimes is not to prohibit the possession itself. MOORE, supra note
12, at 21-22.
38 Husak, supra note 31, at 2453.
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affairs over which a person lacks control. ' 39 The upshot of control is
that it provides an alternative scheme in which to base criminal liability
that does not have to deal with the complicated problem of defining and
distinguishing actions, omissions, and possessions. Thus, the elegance
of the proposal lies in its simplicity. If the actor had control over the
state of affairs, then a primafacie case can be argued in favor of holding
him responsible for said state of affairs.
The problem with the control principle is that it proves too much.
Myriad examples could be given of actors who should not be held
criminally responsible despite the fact that they had control over a given
event. Suppose, for example, that a hurricane threatens to approach
your area. Your next-door neighbor is out of town and will not be able
to make it back home until after the hurricane passes because all flights
in and out of the area have been cancelled. Therefore, he calls you in
order to ask you to board up his house so that the storm does not
damage it. Upon his return, he would pay you a considerable amount of
money as a token of appreciation for your help. Even though you had
the time and resources to help your neighbor, you decide not to in order
to go to the movies. As forecasted, the hurricane ravaged the area and,
consequently, your neighbor's house was destroyed. Should you be
held criminally responsible for the damages caused to the house? In our
opinion, the answer is clearly "no" because you were not under a
statutory duty to board your neighbor's house. However, under Husak's
control principle, there is no reason not to hold you liable. In view of
the fact that you had the time and resources to board up your neighbor's
house, it should be concluded that you had "control" over whether or
not it was going to be damaged by the storm. Hence, there would seem
to be no impediment to hold you liable for the commission of the
offense of criminal mischief. This is surely wrong. The right answer
seems to be that your conduct constituted a non-punishable omission
because no law existed that required you to engage in the action of
helping your neighbor.
Ultimately, the implications of the control principle are either false
or trivially and uncontroversially true. The consequences of the
principle are false inasmuch as they, as we just explained, prove too
much. They are true, however, if we take the control requirement to
mean that no liability can be imposed if the defendant did not have the
physical capacity to control the state of affairs. Imagine, for example,
that rioting prisoners handcuffed all correctional officers to steel beams
located throughout a prison. If the prisoners successfully escaped from
prison, the correctional officers should not be held liable for violating
their duty to prevent the escape. Even though they failed to prevent the

39 HUSAK, supra note 29, at 98.
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escape despite having a duty to do so, they will not be held liable
because they were handcuffed to the beams, thus lacking physical
control over the situation. Hence, control can and does play an
important role in these instances. This, however, is a rather trivial
point. No one actually denies that actors who lack the physical ability
to prevent the result from ensuing should be held criminally responsible.
The fact that someone cannot be held liable for an act that he could not
stop is uncontroversial. The problem is that control is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition for liability. As the case of the out of town
neighbor demonstrates, actors escape punishment in many instances
where they had control over the situation. Therefore, the control
principle cannot meaningfully limit the number of conducts that may
trigger the imposition of punishment. As a result of this, in our opinion,
Husak's control principle is not normatively more appealing than the act
requirement that Fletcher defends in his Grammar.

CONCLUSION

Fletcher's communicative theory of action represents an
improvement over alternative theories. It compares favorably with the
causal and teleological concepts of action that were elaborated in civillaw jurisdictions during the last fifty years because it is premised on the
fact that a concept of action can only be normatively appealing once it is
divorced from metaphysical and ontological abstractions.
The
communicative concept of action should also be preferred over Moore's
mechanistic concept of action and Husak's control principle. Moore's
theory of actions as "willed bodily movements" places too much weight
on the movement/non-movement distinction, while Husak's reliance on
control unjustifiably broadens the number of cases that could trigger the
imposition of criminal liability. Ultimately, moral judgments on
criminal responsibility should be based on whether or not the
defendant's conduct could be intersubjectively construed as an instance
of meaningful behavior and not on whether or not he willed his muscles
into movement or had control over the state of affairs that ensued. This
is more compatible with Fletcher's concept of action than with Moore's
or Husak's.

